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Abstract
Under credible in￿ation targeting, we suggest that, instead of forming a rational
expectation, some ￿rms ("in￿ation-targeters") might simply expect future in￿ation
to always equal its target. This paper analyses the implications of this for optimal
monetary policy in a standard new-Keynesian model. If shocks have any persis-
tence and in￿ation-targeters are present, the optimal policy frontier is improved
under discretion. Under commitment, although the gains from commitment are
diminished (stabilisation bias is reduced), overall loss is still reduced relative to
the rational expectations benchmark for plausible parameter values. These results
formally show how policies which encourage expectations anchoring may be ben-
e￿cial.
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written.1 Overview
Over the past ￿fteen years, several countries have adopted in￿ation targeting. The an-
choring of in￿ation expectations which this frequently brings about is often argued to be
bene￿cial for the economy. In particular, it is often claimed that in￿ation targeting re-
duces the impact of shocks, with in￿ation and output both being more stable as a result.
It is also generally accepted that in￿ation targeting central banks should communicate
extensively with the public about the plans and objectives of monetary policy.1
This paper makes several contributions which both help to provide formal theoret-
ical support for these propositions, and attempt to analyse the potential theoretical im-
plications of in￿ation targeting on expectations formation and hence some well-known
results in the monetary policy literature. Speci￿cally, we propose a new expectations
formation mechanism ("in￿ation-target expectations") which differs from both ratio-
nal and adaptive expectations, but which may be relevant in countries operating under
credible in￿ation targeting regimes. This mechanism is designed to capture potential
anchoring of in￿ation expectations onto the in￿ation target. We assume that in￿ation-
target expectations are adopted by a fraction of ￿rms, while the remaining ￿rms use
rational expectations. We then use these assumptions to illustrate precisely how an-
chored expectations may be bene￿cial for the economy in a formal theoretical model.
In particular, we provide a concrete theoretical explanation of why the impact of shocks
is likely to be muted under in￿ation targeting, with both in￿ation and output being more
stable as a result. Finally, we also show that stabilisation bias will be reduced if some
￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations, thus implying that the gains from commitment
may not be as great as the current literature suggests.
In terms of policy, our results suggest that if some ￿rms use in￿ation-target expec-
tations, central banks should respond less aggressively than they otherwise would to
cost-push shocks which exhibit any persistence. They also have the clear implication
that in￿ation targeting is likely to be more successful if the central bank can persuade
￿rms to believe that the in￿ation target will always be hit, thus anchoring expectations.
Therefore, our model provides concrete theoretical support for the notions that central
banks should publicise their targets widely, signal that they are fully committed to them,
and regularly explain how they are trying to meet them.
2 Introduction
Although the ￿rst countries to adopt formal in￿ation targeting only did so in the early
1990s, it has rapidly become one of the main frameworks for conducting monetary pol-
icy. It is already used in a wide range of countries and there are continuing discussions
1For example, see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) and Bernanke (2003), who argue
(informally) in favour of all of these propositions.
1about whether the United States Federal Reserve should also adopt a formal in￿ation
target (for a recent example, see Goodfriend, 2005).
The empirical evidence tends to suggest that once the regime is established and
has gained credibility, in￿ation targeting helps to lower in￿ation expectations, effec-
tively by inducing them to be anchored onto the in￿ation target. (In almost all countries
which have adopted in￿ation targeting, in￿ation expectations were initially above the
speci￿ed in￿ation target.) For example, using both survey data on expectations and ev-
idence from interest-rate differentials for New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom
and Sweden, Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) ￿nd that once credibil-
ity had been established, in￿ation targeting helped to reduce private-sector in￿ation
expectations. They conclude by noting (p. 297) that: "In all the cases we have stud-
ied, countries using in￿ation targets signi￿cantly reduced both the rate of in￿ation and
the public’s in￿ation expectations relative to their previous experience and, probably,
relative to what they would have been in the absence of in￿ation targets". Similar con-
clusions are also reached by Johnson (2003). Slightly more direct empirical evidence
that in￿ation expectations may be anchored under in￿ation targeting is presented by
Sheridan (2001, cited in Ball and Sheridan, 2005), who ￿nds that the regime dampens
movements in expected in￿ation. Moreover, Gavin (2004) and Gurkaynak, Sack and
Swanson (2003) present evidence suggesting that in￿ation expectations are better an-
chored in in￿ation targeting countries than in non-in￿ation targeting countries. Finally,
Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2003) ￿nd that it is indeed
the in￿ation target (or, where a symmetric target range is used, the midpoint of that
range) onto which expectations are anchored in in￿ation targeting countries.
In terms of expectations, the experience of the United Kingdom is particularly strik-
ing. As King (2005, p. 13) observes, "whether you measure them by bond yields,
index-linked versus conventional yields, or surveys, in￿ation expectations in Britain are
now pretty well anchored on the [in￿ation] target". Moreover, considering this set of
data over the past few years, Bank of England (2004, p. 10) argues that there is "rea-
sonably strong evidence that in￿ation expectations have been close to the target since
1997, despite the shocks that have occurred".2 Although data from the ￿nancial mar-
kets tend to re￿ect in￿ation expectations at fairly long time horizons, surveys usually
re￿ect expectations at much shorter time horizons (typically one year ahead). Since
short-term in￿ation expectations are more likely to be the relevant variable for ￿rms’
pricing decisions, the evidence from surveys is particularly interesting. As illustrated by
King (2002, Chart 7) and Bank of England (2004, Chart A), if we exclude the general
public, UK in￿ation expectations one year ahead as measured by the Barclays Basix
quarterly survey have been very close to the of￿cial in￿ation target ever since the Bank
of England was given sole responsibility for setting monetary policy in 1997. Moreover,
2King (2002) discusses some of this evidence in more detail.
2in￿ation expectations were consistently higher before 1997 (falling dramatically almost
immediately afterthe Bank ofEngland’s independence wasannounced) and evenhigher
(and also much more volatile) prior to the initial adoption of in￿ation targeting in 1992.
In terms of whether the adoption of in￿ation targeting has reduced the impact of
shocks and led to improved macroeconomic performance, Mishkin (1999) claims that it
has. So do Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999): at the end of their detailed
discussionwhichconsidersbothcross-countryempiricalevidenceandcasestudies, they
conclude (p. 298) that "there does seem to be evidence that the effects of in￿ationary
shocks are somewhat muted under [in￿ation targeting]". Moreover, in their more recent
cross-country study, Neumann and von Hagen (2002) ￿nd that the adoption of in￿ation
targeting has helped to curb the volatility of in￿ation and interest rates. Finally, for the
speci￿c case of the United Kingdom, Benati (2004) ￿nds that both in￿ation and output
have been much more stable since the adoption of in￿ation targeting. As argued by
King (2002), this is despite the fact that shocks to the economy have been at least as
large as in previous decades.
Although the discussion above strongly suggests that in￿ation targeting helps to
anchor expectations and reduce the impact of shocks, the evidence, particularly that re-
lating to supposed superior macroeconomic performance as a consequence of in￿ation
targeting, has been challenged by Ball and Sheridan (2005). They argue that countries
which introduced in￿ation targeting had high and volatile in￿ation initially and that
their improved performance is simply a consequence of generic regression to the mean.
When they control for this in their empirical analysis of 20 OECD countries, they ￿nd
that there is no evidence that the in￿ation targeting countries performed better. How-
ever, Gertler (2005) is somewhat sceptical of their results. He notes that the decision
to adopt in￿ation targeting is likely to be endogenous and it may have been the case
that the countries which adopted the regime did so because they initially had high and
unstable in￿ation. As a result, the (signi￿cant) coef￿cients on the initial condition terms
in Ball and Sheridan’s regressions may re￿ect the embedded impact of in￿ation target-
ing rather than reversion to the mean. Moreover, in their analysis, Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin and Posen (1999) dealt with the issue of regression to the mean to a certain ex-
tent by comparing the in￿ation targeting countries with "control" countries which they
regarded as having very similar characteristics and initial conditions (e.g. Italy, for com-
parisons with the United Kingdom and Sweden; and Australia, which was not in￿ation
targeting for most of the period they were considering, for comparisons with Canada
and New Zealand). They generally found that the performance of the control countries
was inferior. Therefore, despite the evidence of Ball and Sheridan (2005), it still seems
likely that in￿ation targeting does help to improve macroeconomic performance to a
certain extent, and many authors retain this view.
Supposing that it is indeed the case that in￿ation targeting has muted the impact of
3shocks and resulted in more stable in￿ation and output, this then raises the question of
what aspect(s) of in￿ation targeting may have caused this. As noted by Benati (2004),
this question becomes particularly intriguing when we realise that although reduced in-
￿ation volatility could potentially be attributed to a more aggressive monetary policy
(as might be associated with in￿ation targeting), most existing new-Keynesian models
predict that output volatility should actually increase under this explanation. Therefore,
to try to explain the facts, many authors (e.g. Bank of England, 2004; Bernanke, 2003;
King, 2005) have instead directly cited the bene￿cial effects deriving from the anchor-
ing of in￿ation expectations often associated with in￿ation targeting. However, in the
existing literature, theoretical discussion of this potential link is extremely limited.
The one major exception is Orphanides and Williams (2005). They adopt a learning
model in which agents are always trying to forecast in￿ation rationally but are hindered
in their ability to do so by imperfect knowledge of both the model’s structural parame-
ters and the central bank’s preferences. One of their key insights is that if the central
bank’s in￿ation target becomes known (perhaps because it is formalised or better publi-
cised), agents will no longer have to estimate it, meaning that their forecasting problem
is simpli￿ed and their in￿ation expectations will be more stable and better anchored.
As a result, the optimal policy frontier is improved. However, in their model, in￿ation
and output under a known in￿ation target are still more volatile than under the perfect
knowledge benchmark, in which agents are assumed to either know the model’s pa-
rameters or be able to estimate them perfectly. By contrast, we feel that expectations
anchoring may yield much more signi￿cant bene￿ts, in the sense that outcomes could
be improved relative to the (perfect knowledge) rational expectations benchmark. We
view this as stemming from the fact that the introduction of in￿ation targeting may
change the way in which some agents actually form their expectations: this is in stark
contrast to Orphanides and Williams (2005), who assume that all agents try to form
expectations in the same way, regardless of whether or not there is an in￿ation target.
Speci￿cally, in light of the evidence on expectations presented above, we feel that
under in￿ation targeting, some ￿rms may simply expect future in￿ation to always equal
its target rather than ever attempting to form a rational expectation.3 The introduction
of this expectations formation mechanism (which we describe as "in￿ation-target ex-
pectations" in what follows) is the key novelty in our model. We justify it more fully
in the main body of the paper, once we have speci￿ed the precise assumptions it en-
tails. However, we note here that forming in￿ation-target expectations may be viewed
as near-rational behaviour. This is because the gains from using rational rather than
in￿ation-target expectations may be very small if the target is credible and the central
bank is usually fairly successful in meeting it. As a result, for some ￿rms, these gains
3Inthissense, ourworkmaybeviewedasbeinglooselyrelatedtotherecentliteraturewhichconsiders
non-standard ways of modelling in￿ation expectations (e.g. Ball, 2000; Carroll, 2003; Mankiw and Reis,
2002; Reis, 2004).
4may be more than outweighed by the thinking or calculation costs which are likely to
be associated with forming a rational expectation.4
We introduce the assumption of in￿ation-target expectations into the standard new-
Keynesian Phillips curve and, more broadly, into the new-Keynesian framework for
analysing monetary policy. Although there are some well-known problems with the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve (Mankiw, 2001), we use it as our baseline since it still
represents the benchmark model in the literature and there is no clear consensus on
which (if any) of the proposed alternatives is superior. However, we should note that
our main idea is of broader relevance since, conceptually, in￿ation-target expectations
could easily be introduced into most alternative Phillips curve speci￿cations.
Having speci￿ed a policy objective, we analyse the implications of some ￿rms
adopting in￿ation-target expectations by solving our model for optimal monetary policy
in response to a cost-push shock. We consider both the discretionary case, in which it
is assumed that the central bank is unable to make commitments over the path of future
policy, and the full commitment case, in which it is assumed that it can.5 Under dis-
cretion, we ￿nd that if the shock has any persistence, the central bank should respond
less aggressively to it as the proportion of ￿rms adopting in￿ation-target expectations
increases, due to the bene￿cial anchoring effects that these ￿rms provide. Therefore, the
effect of the shock is muted: the optimal policy frontier is improved; in￿ation and out-
put are more stable; and loss is reduced. The results are slightly more complex under
commitment. As more ￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations, the optimal solution
under commitment increasingly resembles the optimal solution under discretion (or,
put another way, stabilisation bias is reduced). Since the gains from commitment are
diminished, loss relative to the rational expectations benchmark will actually increase
in this case if there is no persistence in the shock. However, for plausible parameter
values and mild persistence in the shock, overall loss will be reduced because the bene-
￿cial anchoring effects of near-rational ￿rms will more than outweigh the minor losses
stemming from the reduced effectiveness of commitment. Taking all of this together,
we therefore argue that the presence of ￿rms adopting in￿ation-target expectations will
generally be bene￿cial for the economy, regardless of whether or not the central bank
can make commitments over the path of future policy. Our model therefore provides a
4For an early microeconomic illustration of why near-rational behaviour may be plausible in some
contexts, see Cochrane (1989). For an early discussion of possible near-rational behaviour towards in-
￿ation, see Turnovsky (1970, p. 1453); for a more extensive discussion, see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry
(2000). To a certain extent, our paper draws on their work.
5There is an extensive literature discussing whether or not central banks can make credible commit-
ments over future policy (see Walsh, 2003, chapter 8, for a recent survey). Although this is clearly an
important issue, we leave it aside for two reasons. Firstly, we wish to identify the potential gains from
commitment in our model. Therefore, it makes sense to consider the two polar cases: discretion, consid-
ered in section 4, and full commitment, considered in section 5. Secondly, our interest is in the impact of
￿rms adopting in￿ation-target expectations on optimal monetary policy and it therefore seems sensible
to consider their impact in both of the benchmark cases commonly discussed in the literature.
5concrete theoretical explanation of precisely how the anchoring of expectations which
may be associated with in￿ation targeting can help to reduce the impact of shocks and
lower the volatility of both in￿ation and output.6
The proportion of ￿rms adopting in￿ation-target expectations is likely to depend on
how well-known and credible the in￿ation target is. Therefore, in terms of policy, our
model is consistent with the standard recommendations that central banks should publi-
cise their in￿ation targets widely and attempt to raise awareness about monetary policy
decisions. However, in contrast to much of the existing literature (with the exception
of Orphanides and Williams, 2005), it provides a clear theoretical reason for precisely
why these policies may be bene￿cial in terms of superior macroeconomic outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 introduces the ba-
sic model, characterises the notion of in￿ation-target expectations more precisely, and
provides further motivation for the assumption. Section 4 solves our model for optimal
monetary policy under discretion, while section 5 solves it for the commitment case.
Finally, section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our results.
3 Introducing the Model
We work within the new-Keynesian framework for analysing monetary policy. Specif-
ically, we adopt a simple closed economy model similar to those used in Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999) and Walsh (2003, chapter 11). It consists of three components: a
new-Keynesian Phillips curve modi￿ed to incorporate in￿ation-target expectations; a
standard expectational IS curve; and a standard central bank objective function. To
simplify and clarify the analysis, we mainly focus on the key aggregate relationships in
what follows: for an extensive discussion of the model’s microfoundations, see Wood-
ford (2003).
3.1 The In￿ation-Target Expectations Phillips Curve
3.1.1 Basic Assumptions
We assume that the economy is populated by small, identical, monopolistically compet-
itive ￿rms, each of whom faces an isoleastic demand curve for its differentiated product.
However, ￿rms are constrained in their ability to reset prices. Speci￿cally, following
Calvo’s (1983) model of staggered price adjustment, we assume that in each period,
￿rms must keep their prices ￿xed with probability ￿. Moreover, we assume that each
6In the context of the United Kingdom, it could also help to explain why the Bank of England has
never missed its in￿ation target by more than one percentage point (and therefore never been required
to write an Open Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer), even though early predictions (e.g. Bean,
1998) suggested that Open Letters would be triggered fairly frequently.
6￿rm has the same ex ante probability of being able to adjust its price in any given period
- this means that the ￿rm’s reset probability is independent of its history. This formu-
lation implies that, for any given ￿rm, the expected number of periods between price
adjustments is 1=(1 ￿ ￿): from this, we can see how the parameter ￿ may be viewed as
a measure of the degree of price rigidity in the economy.
With all variables expressed in logs (as they will be throughout this paper), it can
then be shown that the aggregate price index at time t, pt, evolves according to:
pt = ￿pt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)pt (1)
where pt is an index re￿ecting the reset price of ￿rms that are able to change their price

















t is the ￿rm’s nominal marginal cost (as a percentage deviation from its
steady-state level) and ￿ is a discount factor (constrained to lie between zero and one).7
Note that (2) may be re-expressed as:
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where mct is the ￿rm’s real marginal cost (as a percentage deviation from its steady-
state level) and ￿t = pt ￿ pt￿1 is in￿ation at time t.
Equations (1) and (2) both have intuitive interpretations. From (1), we can see that if
no ￿rm is able to change its price (￿ = 1), the aggregate price index will be unchanged
from the previous period; if all ￿rms can change their price (￿ = 0), the aggregate
price index will equal the index re￿ecting the reset price of ￿rms in each period; while
if 0 < ￿ < 1, then, as we might expect, the aggregate price index will be a weighted
averageofthesetwoextremecases. Equation(2)showsthatwhenchoosinganewprice,
fully rational ￿rms will take account of current and expected future nominal marginal
costs. However, expected nominal marginal costs further into the future are given less
7The derivations of (1) and (2) assume that in￿ation is zero in steady-state: with a positive in￿ation
target (which will be allowed for in this paper), steady-state in￿ation will be positive and, as shown
by various authors (e.g. Rotemberg, 2002; Bakhshi, Burriel-Llombart, Khan and Rudolf, 2003; Ascari,
2004), there will be additional terms in (1) and (2). However, when allowing for positive in￿ation targets,
we have very low targets in mind (similar in magnitude to the targets currently in place in developed
in￿ation targeting countries). As a result, any steady-state in￿ation will be minimal and the additional
terms in (1) and (2) will be of minor signi￿cance (for further discussion of this point, see Woodford, 2003,
chapter 3, footnote 32). Therefore, for simplicity and clarity, it seems sensible to omit them. Moreover,
note that we always have the option of setting the in￿ation target to be zero in our model, in which case
there are no additional terms in (1) and (2). We therefore proceed by adopting (1) and (2) as stated, even
though we will be allowing for a positive in￿ation target.
7weight. This is both because of discounting, and because, the further away the date,
the greater the probability that the ￿rm will be able to change its price again before that
date is reached, thus making the current expectation irrelevant.
We now introduce near-rational ￿rms into the model in a comparable way to Gali
and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and Steinsson (2003). We
assume that only a fraction 1 ￿ ! of ￿rms are fully rational and reset their prices ac-
cording to (3). The remaining fraction ! of ￿rms are assumed to be near-rational. As
will be discussed below, these near-rational ￿rms form their expectations in a different
way to fully rational ￿rms and will therefore choose a different reset price, pnr
t .8
The introduction of near-rational ￿rms means that the index of newly reset prices is
given by:













t ￿ pt) + ! (p
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t ￿ pt)] (5)
Thus far, our model is similar to the those contained in Gali and Gertler (1999) and
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001). However, these papers proceed by assuming
that near-rational ￿rms adopt a simple backward-looking rule of thumb, choosing their
reset price to be the previous period average reset price, corrected for in￿ation using
the lagged in￿ation rate. We do not adopt this assumption. Instead, we assume that
￿rms are operating under a regime of in￿ation targeting and that all ￿rms are aware
of the (constant) in￿ation target, ￿T. (Consistent with the targets currently in place in
developed in￿ation targeting countries, we have a very small, positive target in mind
here.) Moreover, we assume that near-rational ￿rms form expectations according to:
Et f￿t+kg = ￿
T 8k ￿ 1 (6)
Et fmctg = mct (7)
Et fmct+kg = 0 8k ￿ 1 (8)
8Note that this way of introducing rule of thumb behaviour into the benchmark new-Keynesian model
differs from the approach of Yun (1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). In these papers,
it is assumed that all ￿rms sometimes set their prices optimally, but between (optimal) price adjustments
they adopt a rule of thumb indexing rule which updates their prices in every period in line with steady-
state in￿ation (Yun) or previous period in￿ation (CEE). This only makes sense if we assume that the
impediments to setting optimal prices more frequently are solely thinking or calculation costs rather than
menu costs. However, as discussed by Taylor (1999), microeconomic evidence strongly suggests that
most ￿rms do not change their prices as frequently as every quarter, presumably because menu costs do
not make it worthwhile for them in low in￿ation environments. Therefore, we feel that the real root of
near-rationalbehaviourstemsfromthefactthat, duetoexcessivethinkingorcalculationcosts, some￿rms
may never set their prices in a fully optimal way, while menu costs reduce the frequency with which they
change prices (whether or not they are behaving in a fully optimal way when they change their price).
8In other words, near-rational ￿rms observe and take into account current marginal cost
shocks but expect future in￿ation to always equal its target and future marginal costs
to always be at their steady-state level. In what follows, if ￿rms adopt (6)-(8), we will
describe them as "in￿ation-targeters" who are forming "in￿ation-target expectations".
Note that by substituting (6)-(8) into (3), we can see that the reset price of near-rational
￿rms in our model is given by:
p
nr





3.1.2 Motivating In￿ation-Target Expectations
The introduction of in￿ation-target expectations represents the key innovation in our
model and it drives all of our new results. Therefore, it is important to motivate the set
of assumptions it encapsulates. The ￿rst thing to note is that if ￿rms have assumed (6),
the only consistent expectation regarding future marginal costs is for them to assume
that they are zero. This is because forming a rational expectation of future marginal
costs would incur the costs of being rational, meaning that the ￿rm may as well form
a rational expectation of future in￿ation as well. Moreover, adopting a rule of thumb
implying non-zero future marginal costs would only be consistent with a rule of thumb
implying that future in￿ation would be different from its target (note that if ￿rms expect
future marginal costs to be positive (negative), they should expect future in￿ation to be
above (below) its target). Hence (8) must follow as a direct consequence of (6). As for
(7), it seems plausible to suggest that near-rational ￿rms are aware of their current costs
when setting prices. As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that they can observe
and take account of current marginal cost shocks.
Therefore, the key component of in￿ation-target expectations is captured by (6).
Some empirical motivation for this assumption has already been provided in section 2;
here we assess it in a more theoretical sense. The ￿rst thing to note is that if there are
no shocks, the expectation will be correct because the central bank will always hit the
in￿ation target in this case. In other words, in￿ation-target expectations are correct in
steady-state. Perhaps more interestingly, and in stark contrast to adaptive expectations
and other backward-looking rules of thumb, they will also be correct if all shocks are
white noise. This is because when shocks have a mean of zero and are completely
unpredictable, the best (i.e. rational) forecast of future in￿ation is simply the in￿ation
target. By contrast, ￿rms using backward-looking rules will make systematic mistakes
if shocks are white noise. To see this, consider the case of a positive, non-persistent
shock in period t which raises in￿ation in that period. The rational forecast of in￿ation
in period t+1 is still ￿T. However, ￿rms using backward-looking rules will extrapolate
in some way based on period t in￿ation and will therefore (incorrectly) expect in￿ation
in period t + 1 to be above ￿T.
9In￿ation-target expectations also have a second major advantage over backward-
looking rules of thumb: ￿rms using them do still take account of the expected time
until their next price change (compare, for example, with the rule of thumb proposed
by Gali and Gertler, 1999, for which this is not the case). Therefore, in￿ation-target
expectations may be regarded as being more forward-looking than other rules of thumb
in two separate senses: ￿rms using them both consider the future in￿ation target, and
realise that they may not be able to change their prices again for several periods.
Nevertheless, if shocks are persistent, in￿ation-target expectations will be incorrect.
However, there are three things to note. Firstly, although rational expectations will
outperform in￿ation-target expectations in this case, there may be signi￿cant costs to
being fully rational. These could be viewed as thinking or calculation costs. Critically,
if in￿ation is low and stable, the bene￿ts from being fully rational rather than adopting
in￿ation-target expectations are likely to be minimal and may therefore be outweighed
by these costs, at least for some ￿rms. Secondly, if a high proportion of ￿rms are using
in￿ation-target expectations, then, collectively, near-rational ￿rms will not be getting
too much wrong because, as we will see below, expectations will be so well anchored
that in￿ation will always be fairly near to the target, even in the face of large, persistent
shocks. Finally, even if shocks are persistent, in￿ation-target expectations could still be
more correct (i.e. closer to the rational forecast) than backward-looking rules of thumb
(though the precise relative performance of in￿ation-target expectations against other
rules will depend on the exact nature of the shock).
Takingallofthistogether, wefeelthatunderaregimeofin￿ationtargeting, in￿ation-
target expectations are just as plausible (and probably more plausible) than other rules
of thumb which have previously been proposed. Therefore, near-rational ￿rms who ￿nd
it too costly to form a rational expectation may well choose to adopt in￿ation-target ex-
pectations as a quick and easy rule for forming expectations.
3.1.3 The New-Keynesian Phillips Curve under In￿ation-Target Expectations
Having motivated in￿ation-target expectations, we are now able to derive our modi￿ed
version of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. In Appendix A, we show that provided
that ! 6= 1, the marginal cost version of this is given by:
￿t =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
[mct ￿ !￿￿Et fmct+1g]+￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]Et f￿t+1g+!￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
T
(10)
Our model of the Phillips curve is now almost complete. However, before being
able to use it for policy analysis, we must ￿rstly relate the marginal cost terms to some
measure of output, and, secondly, introduce a potential source of shocks into it. We deal
10with both of these issues by assuming that:
mct = ￿ (yt ￿ y
￿) + et = ￿xt + et (11)
where yt is output at time t, y￿ is the natural rate of output, xt is the output gap at time
t, and et is a cost-push shock. The cost-push shock is assumed to evolve according to:
et = ￿et￿1 + "t (12)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is a parameter measuring the degree of persistence in the shock and
"t is an independent and identically distributed random variable with zero mean and
variance ￿2
" (i.e. an unforecastable error term).
Provided that ￿rms face constant returns to scale, it can be shown that this frame-
work generates the proportional relationship between marginal cost and output con-
tained in (11) (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, or Woodford, 2003).
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, footnote 15) then argue that the cost-push shock con-
tained in new-Keynesian models may be interpreted as a deviation from this equilibrium
condition. They also give some examples of potential shocks which may mean that mar-
ginal cost does not change proportionately with output. More speci￿cally, Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2001) formally relate the cost-push shock in (11) to wage mark-up shocks.
Therefore, despite the lack of a clear consensus on how best to introduce shocks into
the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, we feel that the approach adopted above is the one
which is most clearly consistent with microfoundations.
We can now use (11) and (12) to rewrite (10). This gives:
￿t = ￿[xt ￿ !￿￿Et fxt+1g]+￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]Et f￿t+1g+!￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
T +￿et (13)
where ￿ = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿ and ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ !￿￿￿)=￿. Equation
(13) is our modi￿ed version of the standard new-Keynesian Phillips curve. In what
follows, we describe it as the "in￿ation-target expectations Phillips curve (ITEPC)".
We may use (13) to derive the steady-state output gap, xt = x, which is consistent
with the in￿ation target being hit. To do this, note that in steady-state, ￿t = Et f￿t+1g =







From (14), we can see that, as in other similar new-Keynesian models (e.g. Woodford,
2003, p. 246), x is increasing in the in￿ation target and there is a small long-run output-
in￿ation trade-off. Note, however, that if ￿ = 1 (i.e. there is no discounting), then
x = 0 and there is no long-run trade-off, while for plausible values of ￿ (i.e. close to
one), x will be close to zero and will only increase very slowly in the in￿ation target.
11Having derived (14), we can use it to rewrite our Phillips curve, (13), in terms of
in￿ation and output gaps. This gives:
￿t￿￿
T = ￿[(xt ￿ x) ￿ !￿￿(Et fxt+1g ￿ x)]+￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿




3.1.4 Comments on the In￿ation-Target Expectations Phillips Curve
Equation (15) represents a Phillips curve which is entirely new in the literature. It de-
rives solely from the assumption that some ￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations. As
we would expect, when ! = 0 (i.e. when there are no in￿ation-targeters), (15) reduces
to the conventional new-Keynesian Phillips curve which is extremely widespread in the
literature. Therefore, we can see that our model encompasses the standard framework.
It is also interesting to consider what happens to our Phillips curve in the limit as
! ! 1 (recall that the derivation in Appendix A is invalid when ! = 1).9 In this limit,
if we ignore the shock, (15) becomes:
￿t ￿ ￿
T = ￿(xt ￿ x) ￿ ￿￿￿(Et fxt+1g ￿ x) + ￿￿
￿
Et f￿t+1g ￿ ￿
T￿
(16)
Since the coef￿cient on the expected in￿ation term does not go to zero in this case,
it may at ￿rst seem as if the ITEPC retains a forward-looking component in this limit
even though no ￿rms are forward-looking. However, this is an illusion since the unique
bounded solution of (16) in steady-state is:
￿t ￿ ￿
T = ￿(xt ￿ x) (17)
which clearly has no forward-looking component. Moreover, (17) is identical to the
solution we obtain if we solve our model directly for the case where ! = 1.10
For values of ! between zero and one, the ITEPC is quite intuitive. If expected
in￿ation is above the target (i.e. Et f￿t+1g > ￿T), it is clear from (15) that near-rational
￿rms act as a counterbalance, providing a stabilising force for in￿ation and reducing it
to a lower level than it would otherwise be. This gives a preliminary indication of how
the anchoring of expectations associated with in￿ation-target expectations is likely to
stabilise in￿ation following a shock. The ￿!￿￿(Et fxt+1g ￿ x) term in (15) is also
interesting. It implies that if the output gap is expected to be above its steady-state level
in the next period, then, if near-rational ￿rms are present (i.e. ! > 0), in￿ation will not
be as high as it would otherwise be. So, in effect, it may be viewed as another damping
term. It arises because near-rational ￿rms assume that future marginal costs (and hence
9This discussion is motivated by Steinsson (2003, p.1435).
10This can be shown by ￿rstly setting ! = 1 in (5) and then substituting (9) into the resultant expres-
sion. Using (11) (with et = 0) and (14) (with ! = 1), we can then obtain (17).
12future output gaps) will always be at their steady-state levels. Therefore, if the output
gap is expected to be above its steady-state level in the future (as calculated by rational
￿rms), near-rational ￿rms who can reset their prices will not raise them by as much as
fully rational ￿rms. Current in￿ation will therefore be lower than it would otherwise
be: again this is quite intuitive.11
In￿ation Persistence
The ITEPC does not include a term in lagged in￿ation. This may seem to be at odds
with the empirical evidence which suggests that in￿ation does exhibit some persis-
tence. However, if cost-push shocks are serially correlated, then (15) is able to gen-
erate the kind of in￿ation persistence necessary to match the observed data. Indeed,
Jensen (2002) ￿nds that persistence in US in￿ation over the period 1960-1998 is better
explained empirically by highly correlated shocks than by the introduction of lagged
in￿ation terms into the Phillips curve.
Moreover, there is no clear consensus on how to introduce a lagged in￿ation term
into the Phillips curve in a way which is consistent with microfoundations, especially
when the in￿ation target is constant and known by all ￿rms, which is what we are
assuming in this paper.12 For example, as argued by Taylor (1999), the frequently
cited approach of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) is inconsistent with optimising behaviour.
Meanwhile, although the recent approaches of Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) are more consistent with microfoundations, both ap-
proaches still incorporate an ad hoc rule of thumb. Moreover, as shown by Mash (2005),
if the coef￿cients on the rules of thumb assumed in these papers are chosen optimally
by ￿rms, then these models are no longer able to explain in￿ation persistence.
Finally, it seems unlikely that including a term in lagged in￿ation will change the
qualitative theoretical results of this paper. Therefore, since this paper is intended to
analyse the theoretical implications for monetary policy of a speci￿c change in in￿ation
expectations formation rather than attempting to match the data, it seems sensible not
to include a lagged in￿ation term, both for simplicity and clarity. However, note that
conceptually, it is a simple extension to incorporate such a term into our model. For
example, we could assume the existence of three types of ￿rms in our framework: fully
rational ￿rms, in￿ation-targeters, and backward-looking ￿rms who adopt the rule of
thumb proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999). We regard this as a fruitful area for future
research, especially if some consensus can be reached on how best to motivate the
presence of a lagged in￿ation term in the standard new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
11Note that Et f￿t+1g = Et fpt+1g ￿ pt and Et fpt+1g is increasing in Et fxt+1g, so it is not the
case that a rise in Et fxt+1g actually lowers in￿ation.
12This assumption rules out the explanation, proposed by Erceg and Levin (2003), that in￿ation per-
sistence may arise when agents do not perfectly observe the in￿ation target and are therefore unable to
disentangle permanent changes in it from transitory shifts in monetary policy caused by shocks.
133.2 The IS Curve
We adopt a standard expectational IS curve which may be derived by log-linearising the
representative household’s Euler equation for optimal consumption. This yields:





(it ￿ Et f￿t+1g) (18)
where it is the nominal interest rate. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate
may be varied freely and costlessly, and that the central bank has no desire to smooth
interest rates. This, together with the fact that the goods market adjusts instantaneously
(as implied by the form of the IS curve), means that (18) imposes no real constraint on
the central bank.13 As a result, we can view the central bank as choosing xt+i directly
(rather than it+i) in all of what follows.
3.3 Policy Objective

















where ￿ represents the relative weight placed by the central bank on stabilising the
output gap. As is common in the recent literature, we have assumed that the central
bank does not have an overly ambitious output target (recall that x is the steady-state
output gap consistent with the in￿ation target being hit). Therefore, our model will not
generate an average in￿ation bias.
Although we have not derived (19) explicitly from a utility-based welfare function
for our speci￿c model, loss functions of this type are used widely in the literature.
Moreover, Svensson (1999) argues that, in practice, central banks generally regard the
loss function to be of the form described by (19), and Bean (2003) appears to con￿rm
this for the case of the United Kingdom. Therefore, for ease of comparison with the
existing literature, practical relevance, and simplicity, we proceed by adopting (19).
13Instantaneous adjustment in the goods market may be viewed as unrealistic. However, since this
paper is intended to analyse the theoretical implications of a change in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve,
we wish to keep the remaining components of the model as simple as possible. Nevertheless, modifying
the IS curve to include sluggish adjustment in the goods market is clearly a potential extension.
144 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
4.1 Solving the Model
We now proceed to solve our model for optimal monetary policy in response to a cost-
push shock. In other words, we derive the optimal path for in￿ation and the output gap
that minimises the central bank’s loss function following a shock.
We start by considering the discretionary case, in which it is assumed that the cen-
tral bank is unable to make commitments over the path of future policy. Therefore, it
is assumed that the central bank simply chooses in￿ation and the output gap in each
period to minimise the loss function (19) subject to the ITEPC (15). Since the actions
of the central bank at time t do not bind it at any future dates under discretion, it can-
not in￿uence ￿rms’ expectations about future in￿ation. Therefore the central bank’s













T = ￿[(xt ￿ x) ￿ !￿￿(Et fxt+1g ￿ x)]+￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
Et f￿t+1g ￿ ￿
T￿
+￿et
The full details of the solution to this problem are contained in Appendix B. Com-
bining the ￿rst order conditions for in￿ation and the output gap, we obtain the following






This condition is standard in the literature (especially when ￿T = 0 ) x = 0). By
leading (20) by one period and then substituting both the resultant and original expres-
sions into the Phillips curve (15), we can obtain an expectational difference equation in
terms of xt. Solving this equation using the method of undetermined coef￿cients, we
￿nd that the solution for the output gap under discretion is given by:
xt ￿ x = c1et (21)
where:
c1 =
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 (1 ￿ !￿￿￿)
￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿￿!￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 (1 ￿ !￿￿￿)
(22)






4.2 Discussion of the Solution
As we would expect, when there are no near-rational ￿rms in the economy (! = 0),
these results reduce to the standard case in the literature. Following a positive cost-push
shock, we can see that output will contract while in￿ation will rise above its target.
More interesting is what happens when ! > 0. From (22),
dc1
d! > 0 if ￿ > 0 (if ￿ = 0,
dc1
d! = 0). Since c1 is alwaysnegative, this meansthat as ! increases, themagnitude of c1
decreases. Therefore, in the presence of near-rational ￿rms, it is optimal for the central
bank to respond less aggressively to cost-push shocks which exhibit any persistence. (If
there is no persistence in the shock, then as noted in section 3.1.2, near-rational ￿rms
will actually be acting rationally and, as a result, will not make any difference to the
solution.) As a result, provided that the central bank behaves optimally (and is aware of
the presence of near-rational ￿rms), the impact of (persistent) shocks on in￿ation and
the output gap will be reduced as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases, with
the implication that both in￿ation and output will be more stable as a result.
This is an intuitive result. By assuming that future in￿ation will equal the target and
by ignoring any persistence which may be present in cost-push shocks, near-rational
￿rms are acting as an (in￿ation) anchor: they serve to dampen down the effects of
shocks and permit the central bank to be less aggressive when responding to them. This
is bene￿cial for the economy as a whole: the next subsection shows this by deriving an
expression for loss in our model; the following subsection illustrates it by showing how
the optimal policy frontier changes as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases.
4.2.1 Loss under Discretion
We are able to use our solutions for in￿ation and the output gap to derive an exact
expression for the magnitude of the loss under discretion following a one-off shock in
period t. First note that from (21) and (23) respectively:














where we have used the fact that Et fet+ig = ￿iet, which follows from (12). Sub-
stituting (24) and (25) into the loss function (19) and simplifying, we can obtain an

























2￿2 (1 ￿ ￿￿2)
(26)
Since the magnitude of c1 is decreasing in ! when ￿ > 0, we can immediately see
from (26) that the loss from a (persistent) shock decreases as the proportion of near-
rational ￿rms increases. We can also illustrate this graphically by plotting loss against
!. To do this, we ￿rst need to calibrate the parameters in the model. We interpret the
time interval as one quarter and therefore set ￿ to be 0.75 (implying that, consistent
with the discussion in Taylor, 1999, ￿rms reset their price once a year on average) and
the discount factor, ￿, to be 0.99. We assume that ￿ is 0.0625. This implies that in
annual terms, the central bank places equal weight on output and in￿ation deviations ￿
a standard benchmark case in the literature. Estimates of ￿ (and hence the implied value
of ￿) vary widely. We set ￿ to be 0.6, implying that ￿ is approximately 0.05, which is
the value chosen by Walsh (2003, p. 527). Finally, we assume that the shock, et, is of
magnitude 0.1 (note that this is an innocuous assumption since et only has a scale effect
in (26)).
Given these parameters, we plot loss (multiplied by 105 for greater clarity) against
! for various values of ￿, as depicted in Figure 1. From the diagram, we can clearly see
that provided ￿ > 0, loss decreases as ! increases. Moreover, the gains are particularly
large when ￿ is high.
4.2.2 The Optimal Policy Frontier under Discretion
We are also able to plot the optimal policy frontier for different values of ! in our
model. The optimal policy frontier illustrates the trade-off between in￿ation and output
volatility that the central bank faces following a cost-push shock. From (21) and (23)
respectively, we can see that:


















￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2)
(28)
where we have used the fact that V ar(et) =
￿2
"
1￿￿2, which follows from (12).
In Figure 2, we trace out optimal policy frontiers by taking different values of !
and then plotting (27) against (28) over the range ￿ 2 [0:01;0:25].14 As can be seen,
14For this exercise, we use the calibrated parameter values from the previous section and additionally
assume that ￿2
" is 0.01 (another innocuous assumption which only has a scale effect) and that ￿ is 0.5.
We also multiply V ar
￿
￿t ￿ ￿T￿
by a factor of 16 so that it can be interpreted as the variance of annual





























Figure 1: Loss under Discretion
each policy frontier illustrates the level of volatility in the output gap which must be
tolerated to achieve a given volatility in in￿ation. Considering a ￿xed policy frontier
(e.g. the ! = 0 frontier), it is clear that if the central bank wishes to reduce in￿ation
volatility, it must accept greater output volatility. From this, we can therefore see why
mostexistingnew-Keynesianmodels￿nditdif￿culttoexplainasimultaneousreduction
in both in￿ation and output volatility.
However, it is also evident from the diagram that as ! increases, the optimal policy
frontier improves as signi￿ed by its inward shift. Therefore, we can clearly see that in
our model, it is possible for both in￿ation and output volatility to fall at the same time.
4.3 Summary
In this section, we have shown that if some ￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations,
the central bank should respond less aggressively to cost-push shocks which exhibit
any persistence. Moreover, under the optimal policy, the effect of (persistent) shocks
on the economy will be muted, with both in￿ation and output being less volatile. As a
result, losses will not be as severe. This provides a concrete theoretical explanation of
























Figure 2: Optimal Policy Frontier under Discretion
be bene￿cial for the economy.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment
5.1 Solving the Model
We now consider how our results extend when the central bank is able to make commit-
ments into the future. In this case, the central bank speci￿es a path for in￿ation and the
output gap in all future periods at time t and is assumed to be able to commit to this plan
even if it would be in its best interest to choose a different policy in some subsequent
period. As a result, it is able to in￿uence private sector in￿ation expectations. There-
fore, in period t, subject to the ITEPC (15) holding in every period t + i (where i ￿ 0),
it attempts to minimise the loss function (19) over its entire future rather than period by















+ ￿(xt+i ￿ x)
2
i)
subject to (for all i ￿ 0):
Et f￿t+ig ￿ ￿
T = ￿[(Et fxt+ig ￿ x) ￿ !￿￿(Et fxt+i+1g ￿ x)]
+ ￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
Et f￿t+i+1g ￿ ￿
T￿
+ ￿et+i
19The full details of the solution to this problem are contained in Appendix C. Letting
￿t+i be the period t+i Lagrange multiplier, the ￿rst order conditions for ￿t, xt, ￿t+i for




￿ ￿t = 0 (29)





￿ ￿t+i + [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]￿t+i￿1
￿
= 0 (i ￿ 1) (31)
Et f￿(xt+i ￿ x) + ￿￿t+i ￿ ￿!￿￿t+i￿1g = 0 (i ￿ 1) (32)
Comparing (29) and (30) with (31) and (32), we can immediately see the time inconsis-
tency present in the optimal policy. For example, comparing the in￿ation equations, we
can see that it is optimal to adopt (29) in the present period but to promise to use (31)
in future periods. However, when the next period arrives, it will then be optimal for the
central bank to adopt an updated version (29) in that period rather than abiding by its
earlier promise. In what follows, we assume that this problem is either not an issue or
has been resolved in some way (possibly by institutional design).
Having obtained the ￿rst order conditions, we solve the model by adopting Wood-
ford’s(1999)timelessperspectiveapproachwhichassumesthatthecentralbankignores
(29) and (30), and instead implements (31) and (32) in every period, including the
present period. McCallum and Nelson (2004) argue that this is the most plausible ap-
proach for solving for equilibrium: in particular, they stress that the approach makes
sense if we think of the decision to implement (31) and (32) as having been made at
some point in the distant past.15
Solving (31) and (32) simultaneously, we obtain an expression for expected in￿ation
as a function of output gap terms. We then use this to eliminate the in￿ation terms from
the Phillips curve constraint to obtain a difference equation in terms of xt. Solving
this equation using the method of undetermined coef￿cients, we obtain the solution for
the output gap, which can then be used to derive the outcome for equilibrium in￿ation.
These solutions may be summarised by the following set of equations.
The solution for the output gap may be written in two equivalent forms:
xt ￿ x = ￿0et +
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j ￿ x) (33)
xt ￿ x = (￿1 + !￿)(xt￿1 ￿ x) + ￿0et ￿ !￿￿0et￿1 (34)
15Note, however, that since the timeless perspective policy ignores the ￿rst-order conditions associated
with the very ￿rst period, it is not quite fully optimal. Indeed, as shown by Blake (2001) and Jensen and
McCallum (2002) in the standard case (where there are no near-rational ￿rms), it is not even optimal
within the class of time-invariant policy rules. However, as these authors acknowledge, calibration exer-
cises for plausible parameter values suggest that the relative loss associated with the timeless perspective
policy is likely to be very small.
















where ￿1 is given by the solution less than one of the quadratic equation:
h3￿
2




h2 ￿ h3￿ ￿ h3￿1
(37)
￿j = (!￿)
j￿1 ￿1 8j ￿ 2 (38)
h2 = 1 +
￿2
￿




+ ￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]




5.2 Discussion of the Solution
We ￿rst consider what happens to our solution when ! = 0 and ! = 1. As we would
expect, when there are no near-rational ￿rms, the results reduce to the standard case in
the literature. To see this, note that when ! = 0, (34) and (35) simplify to:



















￿1 + 1 = 0
￿0 =
￿￿￿
￿[1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1)] + ￿2
These expressions constitute the standard solution for optimal monetary policy un-
der commitment. In this solution (and, indeed, also in our model’s solution for all
! < 1), the central bank commits to make future output gaps dependent on the current
output gap following a shock, even if there is no persistence in that shock. In other
words, the optimal policy introduces inertia into the output gap (and hence in￿ation).
The rationale for this can be explained intuitively by ￿xing ! and considering the
21caseofa(non-persistent)positivecost-pushshockattimet. Assumingthattheeconomy
was at steady-state before the shock, this will cause an immediate contraction in output
and rise in in￿ation. However, by (credibly) committing to contract output in future pe-
riods (when et will be zero), the central bank is able to reduce period t expectations of
future in￿ation. Since in￿ation in period t is partly determined by expectations of future
in￿ation, this means that period t in￿ation will be lower than would otherwise be the
case. As a result, the impact of the shock on in￿ation is reduced and, for a ￿xed !, loss
is lower compared to the discretion case in which the central bank is unable to make
credible commitments.16 Therefore, as highlighted by Currie and Levine (1993) and
discussed more recently by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), there may be gains from
commitment even if the policy maker does not have an over-optimistic output target.
Since output is stabilised more in future periods under discretion than under commit-
ment, policy under discretion is often referred to as suffering from a "stabilisation bias".
When ! = 1, the optimal solution under commitment reduces so that it is identical
totheoptimalsolutionunderdiscretion.17 Theintuitionforthisresultisstraightforward.
By its very nature, the commitment solution relies on some ￿rms looking forward in pe-
riod t and taking into account the future path of policy when setting prices. However,
when all ￿rms are adopting in￿ation-target expectations, none of them takes future pol-
icy into account. Therefore, there is no point in the central bank making commitments
over the path of future policy: only current policy can in￿uence in￿ation and the output
gap. As a result, when ! = 1, the central bank’s optimal solutions for in￿ation and
the output gap are determined period by period, as happens under discretion. This has
implications both for the extent of stabilisation bias, and for loss values.
5.2.1 Stabilisation Bias
We have already discussed the presence of stabilisation bias when 0 ￿ ! < 1. However,
since the optimal solutions under commitment and discretion coincide when ! = 1,
there is no stabilisation bias in this case. Therefore, if all ￿rms are near-rational,
there are no gains from commitment. To analyse whether stabilisation bias decreases
monotonically in !, we set ￿ = 0. This eliminates all bene￿cial anchoring effects
16We have already noted above that the timeless perspective policy is not fully optimal since it ignores
the ￿rst-order conditions in the ￿rst period. Therefore, as demonstrated by Blake (2001), it is actually
possible for losses under optimal discretionary policy to be lower than under the timeless perspective
policy. However, this relies on both ￿ and ￿ being fairly low relative to what we might normally expect:
for plausible ranges of the parameter values, McCallum and Nelson (2004) show that the timeless per-
spective policy is always superior. Therefore, when comparing the discretion and commitment solutions
in what follows, our discussion assumes that the timeless perspective policy under commitment always
dominates the optimal policy under discretion.
17To see this formally, ￿rst note that the solution less than one to (36) when ! = 1 is ￿1 = 0.
Therefore, from (38), ￿j = 0 8j ￿ 1 and, as a result, from (33), the solution for the output gap is given
by xt￿x = ￿0et. Straightforward algebra then shows that ￿0, as given by (37), is equal to c1, as given by
(22), when ! = 1. This then proves that the solutions under commitment and discretion coincide when
! = 1.
22provided by near-rational ￿rms (recall that their presence has no impact on loss under
discretion when ￿ = 0) and therefore allows us to isolate the impact of near-rational
￿rms on the difference between the commitment and discretion solutions, and hence
on stabilisation bias. In Appendix D, we show that the magnitude of ￿0 is monotoni-
cally increasing in !. In other words, as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases,
provided that ￿ = 0, it is optimal under commitment to respond more strongly in the
current period to shocks. This is what we would expect intuitively because, as more
￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations, the ability to control in￿ation by making com-
mitments about future output gaps is diminished. Therefore, as ! increases, the optimal
solution under commitment monotonically converges onto the optimal solution under
discretion, and (by implication) stabilisation bias decreases monotonically.
5.2.2 Loss Index under Commitment
From the discussion above, it is clear that the gains from commitment are reduced as
the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases because fewer ￿rms consider the future
policy of the central bank. Therefore, if ￿ = 0 (meaning that near-rational ￿rms have no
bene￿cial anchoring effects), subject to footnote 16, it must be the case that loss under
commitment is increasing in !.
However, if ￿ > 0, the presence of near-rational ￿rms results in a trade-off between
the bene￿cial anchoring effects that they provide and the costs associated with the fact
that commitment is less effective. Unfortunately, in the commitment case, it is not
possible to analytically derive an exact expression for loss as in section 4.2.1 (unless
￿ = 0). However, Blake (2001) and Woodford (2003, pp. 496-497) both show that loss




[V ar(￿t) + ￿V ar(xt)] (39)
Using (34) and (35), we can compute expressions for V ar(￿t) and V ar(xt).19 We
then use the calibrated parameter values assumed in section 4.2.1 to plot the loss index
(again multiplied by 105 for greater clarity) against ! for various values of ￿. Figure 3
restricts attention to low values of ￿; Figure 4 considers higher values of ￿ as well.
From Figure 3, we can see that, as we already know, loss is increasing in ! when
￿ = 0. However, even a small rise in ￿ (to about 0.15) overturns this result: loss rises
slightly for small values of ! (due to the reduced effectiveness of commitment) but, as
! increases, this is more than offset by the gains from greater anchoring, so that when
18Technically, these authors do not include the 1/2 term in (19) and hence it is not present in their
version of (39). In addition, they assume that the in￿ation target is zero. However, assuming a positive
in￿ation target makes no difference to the variance of in￿ation since the target is a constant.
19Though conceptually straightforward, the calculations are very long and are therefore omitted from
































Figure 3: Loss Index under Commitment (for low values of ￿)
! = 1, loss is lower than when ! = 0. As is clear from Figure 4, for higher values
of ￿, loss falls monotonically in ! ￿ the large gains deriving from the anchoring of
expectations are completely dominant.
It is possible that these graphs are affected by the choice of calibrated parameters.
We therefore perform robustness checks by varying the parameters over a range of plau-
sible values.20 The results suggest that the broad picture in Figures 3 and 4 is not sen-
sitive to the particular parameter values used. However, the exact critical value of ￿
above which near-rational ￿rms help to reduce loss is clearly dependent on the choice
of parameters. Therefore, we change the parameters in such a way that increases the
critical ￿: speci￿cally, we reduce ￿ to 0.01 (approximately the lower end of its plausible
range) and raise the implied ￿ to 0.1 (approximately the upper bound for estimates of
￿). Nevertheless, even in this extreme case, the results are not radically different: we
￿nd that as long as ￿ is greater than about 0.35, loss is lower when ! = 1 than when
! = 0, and as long as ￿ is greater than about 0.65, loss falls monotonically in !.
Given the assumption that the time interval is one quarter, and citing the evidence of
Jensen (2002) discussed in section 3.1.4, we would argue that cost-push shocks are very
likely to be highly correlated. In particular, we would argue that it is certainly plausible
for ￿ to be greater than 0.65. Moreover, note that this is an extreme critical value in
20Full results from this analysis are not presented here. However, the spreadsheet which allows robust-


































Figure 4: Loss Index under Commitment (for high values of ￿)
two separate senses: ￿rstly, it is obtained by using highly unfavourable values for the
parameters; secondly, even in this extreme case, slightly lower values of ￿ only result in
small increases in loss when ! is very low, but can still yield fairly large gains (relative
to the ! = 0 case) when ! is high. Finally, even if ￿ = 0; we can see that the relative
losses caused by ￿rms adopting in￿ation-target expectations are extremely small. By
contrast, the potential gains are very large when ￿ is high, Therefore, even if ￿ varies
according to the shock and is sometimes (but not always) zero, near-rational ￿rms are
still, on average, very likely to be bene￿cial for the economy.
Based on this discussion, we would argue that, for plausible parameter values, it
is highly likely that loss (or at least average loss) under commitment is reduced as
the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases. So, even in the commitment case, the
presence of near-rational ￿rms is very likely to reduce the variance of both in￿ation and
the output gap (recall that the loss index (39) is dependent on these two variances) and
be bene￿cial for the economy.
5.3 Summary
In this section, we have shown that, as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases,
the gains from commitment fall, with the optimal solution under commitment increas-
25inglyresemblingtheoptimalsolutionunderdiscretion. Therefore, giventhatsome￿rms
may well adopt in￿ation-target expectations, our results indicate that stabilisation bias
may not be as important an issue as the current literature suggests.
We have also shown that for plausible parameter values and mild persistence in
the shock, overall loss is reduced as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms increases,
despite the fact that commitment becomes less effective. Therefore, the analysis in
this section does not overturn the broad results derived when considering the optimal
policy under discretion in section 4. In particular, it is still the case that the adoption
of in￿ation-target expectations by some ￿rms is very likely to lower both in￿ation and
output volatility, and be bene￿cial for the economy.
6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary of the Paper and its Main Results
This paper was motivated by the idea that in countries which have adopted credible
in￿ation targeting, some ￿rms might simply expect future in￿ation to always be equal
to its target. We formalised this notion in the concept of in￿ation-target expectations.
We then introduced in￿ation-target expectations into the benchmark new-Keynesian
model. Solving our model for optimal monetary policy under discretion, we found that
as the proportion of near-rational ￿rms using in￿ation-target expectations increased, the
impact of (persistent) cost-push shocks on the economy was reduced, with losses being
less severe, and in￿ation and output both being less volatile. In the commitment case,
we found that stabilisation bias was reduced when some ￿rms were adopting in￿ation-
target expectations, suggesting that it may be less of an issue than the literature currently
suggests. We also found that loss was reduced for plausible parameter values and mild
persistence in the shock. Taken together, these results may be viewed as providing a
precise illustration of exactly how the anchoring of expectations often associated with
in￿ation targeting may help to reduce the impact of shocks on the economy and make
both in￿ation and output more stable as a result.
6.2 Possible Extensions
Some possible extensions to this paper have already been proposed. For example, the IS
curvecouldbeadjustedto incorporatesluggishadjustmentinthegoodsmarket(perhaps
due to habit persistence), while a term in lagged in￿ation could be added to the Phillips
curve. The model could also clearly be extended to the open economy context.
Another potentially interesting extension would be to endogenise the parameter !.
It seems plausible that the proportion of in￿ation-targeters could depend on how suc-
cessfully the central bank has met their target in recent periods. Therefore, ! could be
26made a decreasing function of some metric representing recent deviations of in￿ation
from its target. Such a system would probably be non-linear but could be interesting to
simulate. In particular, the system would probably be fairly stable within certain bands
(possibly re￿ecting the target ranges which are associated with many in￿ation target-
ing frameworks) but could be quite unstable outside those bands. Indeed, movement
outside those bands and the associated loss of expectations anchoring could re￿ect a
potential situation which might create severe problems for the central bank and, more
generally, the in￿ation targeting framework. Moreover, endogenising ! could also en-
able analysis of the transition dynamics which might be present as an in￿ation target is
being introduced (when it still may not have gained full credibility).
In￿ation-target expectations could also be incorporated into a greater range of in￿a-
tion models to investigate how the predictions of these models might change. Moreover,
it would be interesting to see whether the introduction of in￿ation-target expectations
into empirical models could help these models to match the data on in￿ation and output-
in￿ation dynamics better.
Finally, the broad principle behind in￿ation-target expectations could apply in other
contexts. In particular, if a target for a particular variable is announced and that target is
credible, then it may generally be the case that some agents will adopt the target itself
as their expectation of that variable rather than using rational (or adaptive) expectations.
Therefore, in￿ation-target expectations could perhaps be viewed as a subset of a more
general expectations formation mechanism which may potentially have implications for
models in other areas of economics.
6.3 Policy Implications
The policy implications of our results are clear. Firstly, in almost all circumstances,
if some ￿rms are using in￿ation-target expectations, central banks should react less ag-
gressivelythantheyotherwisewouldtocost-pushshocks. Secondly, sinceitisgenerally
bene￿cial for the economy if ￿rms adopt in￿ation-target expectations, the central bank
should take any steps it can which may encourage ￿rms to switch to this mode of ex-
pectations formation. For example, central banks could publicise their in￿ation targets
more widely, signal that they are fully committed to meeting them, and attempt to raise
general awareness about monetary policy decisions. In this regard, it may be useful for
in￿ation targeting central banks to introduce schemes similar to the Bank of England’s
"Target Two Point Zero" competition. More generally, greater transparency regarding
the conduct of monetary policy is likely to be bene￿cial. In addition, as suggested by
Bean (2003) and Svensson (2001), point targets may help to anchor expectations more
successfully than target bands: if this is the case, our results strongly suggest that certain
central banks (such as the European Central Bank) may wish to adopt a more precise,
symmetric in￿ation target. Finally, although this paper has not compared in￿ation tar-
27geting with other frameworks for conducting monetary policy, its arguments could be
taken as bolstering the theoretical case for formal in￿ation targeting if it is believed that
expectations are more likely to be anchored under this regime than under alternative
monetary policy regimes. In this regard, the paper sheds interesting light on the current
debate about whether the United States Federal Reserve should adopt a formal in￿ation
target.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we derive the marginal cost version of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve under in￿ation-target expectations. To do this, we ￿rst substitute (3) and (9) into
(5). This gives:
￿t =
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which may be re-expressed as:
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Note that we may also rewrite (40) as:
￿t =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
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Now note that if we update (40) by one period and rearrange, we can obtain:
























28Finally, provided that ! 6= 1 (in which case the left-hand side of (42) is zero), we can
substitute (42) into (41). Doing this, collecting terms and simplifying gives:
￿t =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
[mct ￿ !￿￿Et fmct+1g]+￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]Et f￿t+1g+!￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
T
which is equation (10) in the main text.
Appendix B
In this appendix, we provide the details of the model’s solution for optimal monetary
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To solve this expectational difference equation for xt, we guess a solution of the form:
xt ￿ x = c1et (47)
Given this guess, it must be the case that:
Et fxt+1 ￿ xg = c1Et fet+1g = c1￿et (48)
where we have used the fact that Et fet+1g = ￿et, which follows from (12). We then




















￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿2 (1 ￿ !￿￿￿) + ￿￿￿! (1 ￿ ￿)
Finally, substituting back in for ￿ and ￿ gives the expression in the main text:
c1 =
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 (1 ￿ !￿￿￿)
￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿￿!￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 (1 ￿ !￿￿￿)
(22)
Appendix C
In this appendix, we provide the details of the model’s solution for optimal monetary


















subject to (for all i ￿ 0):
Et f￿t+ig ￿ ￿
T = ￿[(Et fxt+ig ￿ x) ￿ !￿￿(Et fxt+i+1g ￿ x)]
+ ￿ [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
Et f￿t+i+1g ￿ ￿
T￿
+ ￿et+i






























￿ ￿t = 0 (29)





￿ ￿t+i + [1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)]￿t+i￿1
￿
= 0 (i ￿ 1) (31)
Et f￿(xt+i ￿ x) + ￿￿t+i ￿ ￿!￿￿t+i￿1g = 0 (i ￿ 1) (32)
To obtain the timeless perspective solution, we ￿rst need to solve (31) and (32) simul-
taneously to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier terms. We may rearrange (32) as:
￿[1 ￿ !￿L]Et f￿t+ig = ￿￿(Et fxt+ig ￿ x) (49)
where L denotes the lag operator. Therefore, from (49):
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￿1 (Et fxt+i￿1g ￿ x) (51)
Substituting (50) and (51) into (31) gives:
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￿1 (Et fxt+i￿1g ￿ x) (52)
Therefore:
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31Cancelling and then collecting terms, we obtain the following expression for expected
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Substituting (53) and (54) into the i = 0 constraint (15), multiplying through by ￿￿
￿,
and simplifying, we obtain the following difference equation in terms of xt:




j￿1 (xt￿j ￿ x) ￿ h5et (55)
where:
h2 = 1 +
￿2
￿
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To solve this difference equation for xt, we guess a solution of the form:
(xt ￿ x) = ￿0et +
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j ￿ x) (56)
32Given this guess, and using the fact that Et fet+1g = ￿et (which follows from (12)), it
must be the case that:
Et fxt+1g ￿ x = ￿0Et fet+1g +
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j+1 ￿ x)
= ￿0￿et + ￿1 (xt ￿ x) +
1 X
j=1
￿j+1 (xt￿j ￿ x)
= ￿0￿et + ￿0￿1et + ￿1
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j ￿ x) +
1 X
j=1
￿j+1 (xt￿j ￿ x) (57)











￿0￿et + ￿0￿1et + ￿1
1 X
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￿j (xt￿j ￿ x) +
1 X
j=1






j￿1 (xt￿j ￿ x) ￿ h5et (58)
Equating terms in et in (58) and solving for ￿0, we obtain:
￿0 =
￿h5
h2 ￿ h3￿ ￿ h3￿1
(37)
as in the main text. Equating terms in xt￿j 8j ￿ 1 and solving for ￿j, we ￿nd that:
￿j =




Solving this recurrence relation forwards and noting that for convergence, it must be the





































h2 ￿ h3￿1 ￿ h3!￿
(61)
33Rearranging (61) gives the quadratic equation for ￿1 contained in the main text:
h3￿
2
1 ￿ (h2 ￿ !￿h3)￿1 + h4 = 0 (36)
Moreover, for the solutionto be stable, it must bethe case that ￿1 is given by the solution
less than one of (36). Finally, from (60) and (61):
￿j = (!￿)
j￿1 ￿1 8j ￿ 2 (38)
Taking all of this together, we can therefore see that, as in the main text, the solution for
the output gap is given by:
xt ￿ x = ￿0et +
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j ￿ x) (33)
where ￿1 is given by the solution less than one of the quadratic equation:
h3￿
2




h2 ￿ h3￿ ￿ h3￿1
(37)
￿j = (!￿)
j￿1 ￿1 8j ￿ 2 (38)
We now demonstrate that (33) may be rewritten in the alternative form (34). To
show this, ￿rst note that (33) may be rewritten as:
xt ￿ x = ￿0et + ￿1 (xt￿1 ￿ x) +
1 X
j=1
￿j+1 (xt￿j￿1 ￿ x)




j (xt￿j￿1 ￿ x) (62)
wherewehaveusedthefactthat￿j+1 = (!￿)
j ￿1, whichfollowsfrom(38). Meanwhile,
lagging (33) gives:
xt￿1 ￿ x = ￿0et￿1 +
1 X
j=1
￿j (xt￿j￿1 ￿ x)




j￿1 (xt￿j￿1 ￿ x) (63)





j (xt￿j￿1 ￿ x) = !￿(xt￿1 ￿ x) ￿ !￿￿0et￿1 (64)
Substituting (64) into (62) (note that this step is only valid if ￿1 6= 0 ) ! 6= 1), we
therefore obtain the alternative solution form:
xt ￿ x = (￿1 + !￿)(xt￿1 ￿ x) + ￿0et ￿ !￿￿0et￿1 (34)
Finally, to derive the outcome for equilibrium in￿ation, note that the i = 0 version








(xt ￿ x) +
￿
￿
[1 ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿)](xt￿1 ￿ x) (65)

















We wish to show that when ￿ = 0, the magnitude of ￿0 is monotonically increasing in
! over the range ! 2 [0;1). Since h5 does not depend on !, and since both h5 > 0 and




< 0 8! 2 [0;1)
Unfortunately, there is no analytical way of showing this directly. However, using
Maple 9, we can show that the only value of ! for which
d(h2￿h3￿1)
d! = 0 is ! = 1.
This implies that the function has no stationary points in the range ! 2 [0;1). Since the
function is continuous, this means that in the range ! 2 [0;1), it must be the case that
(h2 ￿ h3￿1) is either everywhere increasing in ! or everywhere decreasing in !.
For a particular choice of parameter values, it can be shown on a spreadsheet that
(h2 ￿ h3￿1) is decreasing. (Alternatively, after a very lengthy calculation, it can be
shown that
d(h2￿h3￿1)
d! is always negative when ! = 0 for all values of the other para-
meters.) This implies that the function cannot be everywhere increasing in the range
! 2 [0;1). Therefore, by contradiction, it must be everywhere decreasing and we have
proved the result.
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